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Abstract
We test three practitioner theories-in-use of business process redesign
derived from the business process reengineering (BPR) literature using a positivist
case study of a U.S. company that undertook BPR. The evidence refutes the domi1
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nant technocentric theory-in-use that gives a determining role to IT in achieving
effective business process redesign. The evidence also refutes an alternative
sociocentric view—one that gives a determining role to just the social/human
aspects in achieving effective business process redesign. Instead, the study
provides support for the sociotechnical theory-in-use. For critical researchers and
skeptical practitioners, the overarching lesson of our case study is that business
process redesign is but the latest arena in which researchers and practitioners are
relearning old lessons by repeating the past mistake of adopting a technocentric
approach and sociocentric approach to designing and managing organizations. The
future direction we suggest for researchers and practitioners interested in areas
such as BPR, ERP, and e-commerce implementation, all of which involve business
process redesign, is to adopt, from the beginning, an orientation that is not just
technocentric or sociocentric, but gives equal consideration to the technical and
social dimensions, and the interactions between the social and the technological.
Keywords: Business process redesign, business process reengineering,
case study, IS management, positivist perspective, research methodology, theoryin-use, sociotechnical.
I. INTRODUCTION
Because it has been a decade since business process reengineering (BPR)
established itself as a major area of concern to managers and management
researchers, the time is ripe to begin evaluating what BPR has wrought. Furthermore, to the extent that there is a growing interest in the implementation of enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems as well as intranets, which themselves
necessitate the application of many BPR principles, an assessment of BPR
becomes all the more important. In this study, we take a step in this direction. Our
objective in this paper is to contribute to the body of knowledge on business process
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redesign2 by deductively testing certain concepts and relationships pertaining to
three competing theories-in-use of business process redesign that we discern in the
existing BPR literature. The empirical testing involves observations of a major
information technology (IT) enabled reengineering initiative at a real company. Our
reason for using case research methodology is that the evidence in this study
comes from the real life setting of a single site where a company attempted to
implement BPR.
In this paper, we review the body of knowledge on BPR, where we focus on
the practitioner-oriented literature and on academic commentaries on practice in
order to identify the theories of business process redesign embedded in practitioner
thinking; we discuss our positivist case research methodology and discuss how our
case study meets the standards of positivist rigor; we provide background
information about our case site; we present the evidence from our case and test the
competing theories deductively; and finally, we discuss the implications of this
study.
We believe that our paper makes two important contributions. First, through
deductive testing, the study invalidates the frequently held technocentric perspective-in-use as well as the sociocentric perspective-in-use regarding business
process design and indicates the need for adopting a predominantly sociotechnical
perspective; and second, the study can serve as an exemplar for the positivist case
research methodology.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the theories-in-use embedded in the
literature, we briefly cover some of the basic definitions of BPR terminology that we
use in this paper. The literature has defined BPR in different ways (e.g., Davenport
1995; Keen and Cummings 1994; Hammer and Champy 1993; Schnitt 1993; Sethi
and King 1998; Smith and Willcocks 1995). The need for adopting an appropriate
definition of BPR has been recognized (Manganelli and Klein 1994). In fact, BPR

2

In the next section, we explain the terms business process reengineering (BPR) and
business process redesign (redesign).

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

3

projects have been known to fail because key stakeholders of a BPR initiative have
lacked a clear understanding of what the term BPR means (Hammer and Stanton
1995). While we believe that several definitions proposed in the literature have
merit, we define BPR (drawing on existing literature) as an organization’s activities
of redesigning and implementing broad cross-functional business processes with
the aid of IT enablers and/or organizational enablers in order to obtain significant
performance improvements.
Business process reengineering can be seen as consisting of two analytically
separable steps—business process redesign and implementation of the redesigned
business processes—that are often, although not always, undertaken sequentially
within an organizational BPR initiative. The first step, business process redesign,
involves reformulating the way an organization conducts its business. It involves the
envisioning of new, broad cross-functional business processes, including the supporting roles of IT enablers and/or organizational enablers, all for the purpose of
obtaining significant performance improvements. An effective redesign of business
processes provides a solid foundation for the implementation of the redesigned
processes and thus has a strong potential for contributing significantly to the
success of an overall BPR initiative ( Bjørn-Andersen and Turner 1994; Jones 1994;
Stoddard et al. 1996).

The second step involves the implementation of the

envisioned processes and the accompanying organizational redesign. In this paper,
we focus primarily on the first phase, that of business process redesign.
II. STATE OF THE ART OF BUSINESS PROCESS REDESIGN
A review of the BPR literature shows that a significant proportion of it is practitioner oriented, whether written by practitioners or by academics. This practitioner
orientation has been noted by some leading BPR researchers, who have issued a
call to the academic community to go beyond simple descriptions and “lessons
learned,” and to strive toward “understanding models and attributes of successful
BPR” (Grover and Kettinger 1995, p. viii). While there have been a few attempts
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to develop “frameworks,” “models,” and “constructs” as a foundation for testable
scientific theories (e.g., Grover et al. 1995; Grover et al. 1995b), the overall
literature on BPR has been characterized as “atheoretical” (Guha et al. 1997).
Our own conclusion regarding the state of the BPR literature is consistent
with that of Guha et al., but only partially. That is, while Guha et al. believe that
there is no theory of BPR, we believe that there is no scientific theory of BPR (or of
any subset of BPR, such as business process redesign, which is the focus of our
paper) present in the literature and ready for rigorous testing. Instead, drawing on
the classic work of Argyris and Schön (1978), we believe that the BPR literature
largely represents a form of knowledge (theories-in-use) falling in the realm of
everyday people (here, managers, executives, and other practitioners), in contrast
to another form of knowledge (scientific theories) falling in the realm of academic
researchers (for instance, business school professors who do social-scientific
inquiry). While a theory of action or theory-in-use (Argyris and Schön often use the
two terms synonymously and interchangeably) utilizes everyday concepts from the
world of practice, as opposed to a scientific theory, which uses formal theoretical
concepts accepted in the world of research, the two types of theories are similar in
that they are both theories that can and should be tested and, when refuted by the
facts, be discarded, making room for a better theory (Argyris and Schön 1978).
Argyris (1993, p. 250) further elaborates on theories of action and the implications
such theories have for researchers:
Theories of action are at the core of human competence, self esteem,
and self-efficacy. Individuals gain confidence by acting in ways that
they and others evaluate as effective….Although theories of action
are not theories about some objective truth, they do make claims
about how to act effectively—indeed what is effective in the first place
for a particular individual or group. These claims must be subjected
to the most rigorous tests available, not only because that is good
science but also because we as researchers owe it to practitioners
who may use the knowledge produced by our research and to the
people who receive services from the practitioners.
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Argyris (1993, p. 250) further adds:
In order for theories of action to be tested in everyday life, it must be
possible to derive from them the actual behavior required for
effectiveness. In other words, theories of action must produce actionable knowledge.
In this paper, we identify three theories-in-use in the practitioner-oriented
BPR literature on redesign. Then, as prescribed by Argyris in his own work and his
work with Schön, we test these practitioner theories-in-use by comparing their
predictions against data from everyday life (in the case study).
Before proceeding with a discussion of the theory, we would like to clarify
that, embedded in the huge fragmented body of text on business process redesign,
there are potentially an infinite number of propositions about the topic. In fact, in
some cases, contradictory propositions have been advanced or suggested by the
same authors in different portions of the same work, while, at times, different
theories have been implied by the same authors in different works (Maglitta 1995).
The key point here is that the literature in this area is not at all internally consistent.
The propositions implied in the practitioner-oriented literature on business
process redesign can be classified into three broad but mutually exclusive theoretical perspectives, which we label as technocentric, sociocentric, and sociotechnical.
It is worth noting that an examination of the practitioner literature shows that each
of these three theories exists prominently in the world of practice, regardless of
whether it is consistent or inconsistent with the other perspectives held by the same
or different practitioners or authors. In our opinion, a first step to furthering knowledge in BPR (or in related areas such as ERP that draw on redesign principles) is
to identify which parts of the literature are valid and which parts are invalid, and thus
need to be discarded. This leads to the research question for our study: Which of
the competing theories-in-use reflected in the practitioner-oriented BPR literature
is/are invalid in explaining (or guiding) effective business process redesign? We
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now discuss the three theories and derive the propositions within them that feature
prominently in the literature.
THE TECHNOCENTRIC THEORY OF REDESIGN
Based on our review of the practitioner-oriented literature, we have identified
and articulated concepts forming what we see as the dominant theory-in-use (the
technocentric theory) held by practitioners regarding business process redesign. We
will refer to the academically oriented BPR literature only to the extent that its academic authors are examining the technocentric perspective among BPR practitioners. We expand this theory below.
The technocentric theory has its roots in the logic of technological determinism and emphasizes the role of IT in determining the process and outcome of BPR
redesign and implementation. Within this perspective, information technology is
seen as an independent force determining aspects of an organization at different
levels of analysis (Markus and Robey 1988; Orlikowski 1992). In the history of
technology literature, Bimber (1995) refers to this perspective as a nomological
account of technological determinism. In his words (pp. 83-84):
The claim here is that technology itself exercises causal influence on
social practice.…technological determinism can be seen as the view
that, in the light of the past (and current) state of technological
development and the laws of nature, there is only one possible future
course of...change….In Nomological accounts, the technologicaldriven society emerges regardless of human desires or values.
In addition to the nomological account described above, the technocentric
perspective encompasses situations where a “strategic choice”3 of IT is made by
organizational participants who believe that the chosen/implemented technology will
deterministically lead to certain organizational forms or characteristics. In the practitioner BPR literature as well as the broader IS literature, the technocentric perspec-

3

Orlikowski (1992) uses the term strategic choice differently to include the social constructivist
as well as the sociotechnical perspectives.
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tive manifests itself in the omission of the role of human agents or the existing
organizational social system in organizational change and positing IT as a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for the change.
In academic commentaries of BPR practice as well as practitioner BPR
literature, the technocentric theory among practitioners has been recognized time
and again. For example, in their paper, Guha et al. (1997, p. 120) clearly state that
“earlier practices and writings (in business reengineering) espoused an IT-centric
position.” Willmott and Wray-Bliss (1996, pp. 67-68), in their commentary on BPR,
state:
much of the BPR literature adopts an “essentially technical model of
IS and organizations”...in which ICTs basically drive the reengineered
effort. Hammer for instance elevates ICTs to the status of being “the
critical enabler” of reengineering….It is information technology, not
workers, managers or customers etc. which “permits companies to
reengineer business processes” (Hammer and Champy 1993, p. 83).
For Hammer (1990, p. 104), information technology and
reengineering are virtually synonymous.
Finally, Roy et al. (1998, p. 193) have recently reported, based on four case studies
and a survey of 38 projects, that “most BPR efforts are technically oriented.”
Technology Capabilities as the Driver of Redesign
An important aspect of the technocentric theory-in-use on redesign is that it
views a predominantly IT-oriented approach as necessary for the creation of effective business process configurations (statement S1, below). For example, Venkatraman (1991) suggests that managers must be able to visualize and choose from the
different process designs made possible by the capabilities of IT. Along similar lines,
Stoddard et al. (1996) observe, based on their study of Pacific Bell’s BPR initiative,
that IT plays a prominent role in the redesign process by helping to create new alternatives to accomplish work, and that redesigners’ knowledge of advanced IT features makes the effective formulation of a radical redesign possible. Hammer and
Champy (1993, pp. 84-85) emphatically and unambiguously argue for the need to
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redesign business processes using a technology-driven methodology, and provide
guidelines accordingly:
To recognize the power inherent in modern information technology
and to visualize its applications requires that companies use a form
of thinking that business-people usually don’t learn….Most executives
and managers…are good at defining a problem…then seeking and
evaluating different solutions to it. But applying information technology
to business reengineering demands inductive thinking4—the ability to
first recognize a powerful solution (in this case, IT) and then seek the
problems it may solve.
To summarize, the technocentric practitioner theory-in-use holds that, for
effective business process redesign,5 process designers must, first, identify new
technologies and comprehend their (unique) properties/capabilities and, second,
actively and creatively find organizational problems to solve and opportunities where
they can take advantage of their understanding of the features of the newly identified technologies. They advocate this approach as superior to the traditional
approach of acquiring information technology (i.e., an approach that involves the
design and implementation of IT based on predetermined organizational requirements) since the traditional problem-driven or requirements-driven redesign initiative
is constrained by the state of affairs in the organization prior to reengineering
(Hammer and Stanton 1995). Based on this literature, we offer the following practitioner belief statement6 TS1 (Technocentric Statement 1), which portrays IT-driven
redesign as a necessary although not sufficient condition for effective redesign:
TS1: Effective business process redesign can occur only if the
redesigning is IT-driven.

4

It may be noted that Hammer and Champy use the term inductive thinking in a way that
differs from the use of the term in the academic community, where induction refers to generalization
from the observation of specific cases.
5

We discuss the evaluation of redesign effectiveness in a subsequent section (section V,
Testing Statements) using the notion of “expectation failure.”
6

We purposely use the label “statements” rather than “propositions” to emphasize that they
are derived from practitioner beliefs rather than from formal theories.
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We remind the reader that we offer this not as a formal proposition from a scientific
theory, but as a statement that captures an important element of the practitioner
theory-in-use regarding business process redesign, as reflected in the literature.
IT as the Central Object of Redesign
Within the technocentric theory-in-use of business process redesign, there
is also a view that IT is the central object of redesign in the redesign process—i.e.,
an effective (re)design of the IT is taken to be a sufficient condition for effective redesign of business processes (statement S2 below). The following quotation
accurately captures this idea (Lucas and Baroudi 1994, pp. 18-22):
Traditional organizations are using technology to make changes in
structure without making major modifications to the entire organizations….The traditional organization may call its redesign efforts
“reengineering”….We believe that the design of information technology is the design of organizations [emphasis added].
Manganelli and Klein (1994, p. 261) have also recognized the strong existence of
the technology orientation among practitioners. In their words, “Another thing we
hear said is ‘We’re reengineering; we’ve acquired image processing’ or ‘We’re
reengineering; we’re moving to client/server platforms.’” The assumption that many
practitioners appear to be making as evidenced from the above quotation is that the
acquisition of technologies such as image processing or client-server platforms is
by itself a sufficient condition for (effective) redesign and implementation. A similar
technocentric view among practitioners of BPR has been called “the magic bullet
theory” and documented by Markus and Benjamin (1997):
When we listened closely to what these people told us, we heard
expectations about what it means to be a change agent that differed
sharply from ours. Even non-adopters of change management best
practices believe that they are change agents if they initiate or develop IT, because they think IT itself has the power to create organizational change. These people describe IT as a magic bullet —and
believe that they have built the gun....IT specialists—the tool
builders—play the role of designing and building guns. Builders of
guns that fire magic bullets do not have to worry very much about who
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is going to aim and fire the gun. After all, magic bullets always hit the
right targets. So, the gun builders can focus on the performance
characteristics and aesthetics of their craft, without worrying about the
shooters’ aim or the targets’ ability to dodge.
It is also interesting to note that within the technocentric perspective, as apparent
from the quotations above, the effective design and creation of enabling IT is considered a sufficient condition for not only effective redesign but also successful implementation (Anthes 1996). It is assumed that successful installation of hardware and
software that satisfy functional requirements of the organization will automatically
lead to effective BPR implementation. This emphasis on designing and installing IT
as a sufficient condition for effective redesign and implementation of business
processes, reflected in the discussion of the literature, is captured in the following
statement:
TS2: Successful design (and installation) of enabling IT guarantees
the effectiveness of business process redesign (and the effectiveness of the implementation of redesigned business processes).7
Computerized BPR Tools for Process Mapping
The technocentric practitioner theory-in-use also views computerized BPR
tools as having a positive influence on the development of effective business
process redesigns (statement TS3, below).
Mayer et al. (1995, p. 247) have defined reengineering as “the use of scientific methods, models and tools to bring about the radical structuring of an enterprise,” thus underscoring the importance of tools, mostly computerized, that provide
graphical capabilities and embody different methods/models such as integration
definition (IDEF), activity-based costing, entity-relationship, and simulation. That a

7

Even though the focus of this paper is on the redesign, TS2 includes both redesign and
implementation, because the BPR literature pertaining to TS2 does not clearly distinguish between
the two steps (redesign and implementation).
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large market exists for such tools in the domain of redesign practice is evident from
an examination of trade journals on BPR (such as Enterprise Reengineering), which
feature a large number of advertisements of computerized BPR tools by IT vendors
in each issue, along with occasional reviews of some of the tools by recognized
experts in the field. In Table 1, we provide a sample of claims made by different
vendors regarding the computerized tools offered to BPR practitioners. Most
advertisements suggest that the use of BPR tools will contribute to the effectiveness
of the redesign in terms of cost, speed, ease of process-mapping, ease of
redesigned process implementation, and lowered project risk.
Table 1. Sample BPR Tools and Their Contribution
to Redesign Effectiveness

Sample Tools
System Architect
ProcessMaker
Business Process
Navigator
COSMO and Pen
Analysis Intelligent
Whiteboard
Process Charter

a

Claims regarding contribution to business process
redesign effectiveness (extracted from the advertisements
in a representative issue of Enterprise Reengineeringa)
The fast affordable route to Business Process Rengineering....
Without a large investment of time and money, System Architect lets you reengineer your business process with ease.
ProcessMaker provides tool support for a number of process
Engineering methodologies….Process Engineering [Redesign]
is important, having the right tools makes it easier.
Understand your present processes and identify opportunities
for dramatically increasing their effectiveness. Make discoveries
early, reducing risks and lowering your time and cost.
…significantly accelerates BPR modeling sessions and the
creation of draft models—speeding the process [of redesign]
and reducing the costs.
Build process fast and then evaluate multiple What-if scenarios
with built-in process analysis and powerful simulation tools….
Process Charter helps you better manage every process
throughout your organization.

Volume II, Issue 5, August 1995.

Kettinger et al. (1997) summarize their detailed study of 102 computerized
BPR tools as follows (p. 63):
In summary, the tools survey indicates that an expanding suite of
tools are being used to provide structure and information manage-
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ment capability8 in conducting BPR techniques and possess the
potential to accelerate BPR projects.
Consistent with this point of view, Carr and Johansson (1995) of Coopers and
Lybrand explain and illustrate the importance of using such tools and propose the
following “prospective best practice” for BPR initiatives: “Take advantage of
modeling and simulation tools” (p. 150). Klein (1998, p. 245) also recognizes the
importance of BPR tools, and states:
By using tools, the BPR practitioner expects to improve productivity,
finish projects faster, produce higher quality results and eliminate
tedious housekeeping work in order to concentrate on value-added
work. To produce these benefits, BPR tools should be useable by
businesspeople (managers and professionals), not technicians.
An important aspect of usability is “learnability,” which is further highlighted by Manganelli and Klein. They caution that while several benefits (such as improved
productivity, faster projects, higher quality levels, and elimination of tedious work)
can be expected from reengineering tools, “these benefits come only after first
learning the tool” (p. 214).
Finally, highlighting the importance of BPR tools, Davenport (1993, p. 216)
points out three “paramount” dangers associated with the failure to pursue opportunities provided by advanced technological tools: first, failures to employ these
tools may reduce the pace at which the redesign will progress, and this may reduce
the chances of the initiative’s success; second, these tools are likely to improve the
quality of the product of redesign; and third, the non-use of BPR tools could indicate
that managers are not aware of technological opportunities, consequently undermining the importance of the initiative.
To summarize, the BPR literature has presented many statements indicating
that BPR tools (which are easy to learn and use) have a positive moderating influ-

8

Kettinger et al. (1997) view BPR tools with repositories and data indexing features to
facilitate “collective knowledge sharing” as having information management capability.
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ence on redesign effectiveness. The above discussion leads us to the following
statement reflecting practitioner belief regarding the use of tools for redesign:
TS3: The use of computerized BPR tools9 will enhance redesign
effectiveness.
As mentioned earlier, the literature on business process redesign also
reveals the existence of two competing streams of thought that we label as the
sociocentric theory-in-use and the sociotechnical theory-in-use. We discuss the
sociocentric theory-in-use next.
THE SOCIOCENTRIC THEORY OF REDESIGN
Practitioners adopting the sociocentric perspective to business process redesign assume that organizational outcomes (including the formulation of effective
redesigns) occur not due to the technology but due to human motives and human
action. This perspective underplays the role of technology and focuses (almost
exclusively) on the role of social factors/processes in explaining BPR-related outcomes. Changes in all aspects of organizations (including technology) and their
successes are ultimately attributed to social processes such as leadership, communication, etc. or to arrangements in the organizational structure. The book by
Hammer and Stanton (1995), and the surveys by Bashein et al. (1994) as well as
by Coopers and Lybrand (Carr and Johansson 1995), among others, strongly indicate the existence of the sociocentric theory-in-use among the practitioners. Within
the sociocentric perspective, the success of process redesigns is believed to be
influenced by at least two key factors: the “process vision” of leaders of a redesign
initiative and the composition of the reengineering team.

9

Computerized tools, here, include flowcharting/process-mapping tools and simulation tools.
For this statement, it is also assumed that computerized tools must be easy to learn and use.
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Process Vision of Leaders as the Driver of Redesign
According to Carr and Johansson (1995, p. 45), the person in-charge of a
redesign initiative should be a leader whose primary function is to “establish and
communicate the vision.” The leader should be capable of creative and imaginative
thinking, have a clear sense of the objectives and potential impacts of the reengineering effort, and have a firm belief in the envisaged process changes. According
to Hammer and Champy (1993, p. 103), the role of the leader is “to act as visionary
and motivator....by fashioning and articulating a vision of the kind of organization
that he or she wants to create.”
Davenport (1993, p. 118) describes “process vision” in more tangible terms
as “consisting of specific, measurable objectives and attributes of the future process
state” that can provide “the necessary linkage between strategy and action.” According to Davenport, key activities necessary for developing process visions
include assessing business strategy to obtain a sense of direction for future processes, receiving input from process customers regarding performance objectives,
benchmarking for performance goals and guidelines from other similar redesign
efforts, and developing process performance objectives. It is also believed that any
process change that is initiated without vision will usually fail to go beyond streamlining, resulting in marginal reductions in costs and headcount, thereby proving to
be less than effective (Davenport 1993). Thus, to summarize, much of the literature
seems to suggest that appropriate “redesigns” of processes must come from the
visionary thinking of top management, rather than through a bottom-up collaborative
process, or through a process of technology-driven redesign as proposed by
Hammer and Champy.
The critical importance of the leaders’ vision for effective process redesign
is included as a necessary condition in the following statement within the sociocentric theory-in-use:
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SS1: Effective redesign of processes can be accomplished only if
the redesign is driven by leadership’s vision regarding the
reengineered processes.
The Balanced Composition of the Redesign Team
The quality of process redesign is also believed to be significantly influenced
by the members who serve on the reengineering team and, thus, a careful selection
of these individuals is critical to the redesign effectiveness. Carr and Johansson
(1995, p. 83) offer the following advice regarding the choice of team members:
Choose team members with experience in strategic visioning, change
management, and team improvement initiatives. People with varied
backgrounds, even those without direct experience in the core process to be changed, are important because they can generate new
insights and challenge the status quo more rigorously. They should be
the “best and brightest” in your organization.
Different authors suggest varying approaches to team selections. For example,
according to Carr and Johansson, to obtain a variety of perspectives and to avoid
resistance from different functional areas, cross-functional representation on BPR
teams is considered a good practice. A central figure is the process-innovation consultant (internal or external consultant), who has an organization-wide perspective
and is “politically neutral” regarding any process being reengineered. A facilitator,
who may be an internal or an external consultant, is often included in the team to
“promote cohesion” among the team members (Davenport 1993, p. 186). Hammer
and Champy recommend that such teams should strike a balance between including insiders and outsiders (p. 110). While insiders often have credibility within
the organization and also an intimate knowledge of “what is” (i.e., the current status
of the processes in question), they often tend to be too immersed in the current
state and confuse “what is” with “what should be.” Outsiders, on the other hand,
bring fresh perspectives to the design process but have less credibility in instituting
radical changes. Also, their understanding of the organizational context or con-

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

16

straints within which the redesigned processes are to be implemented is likely to be
limited, which may lead to process designs that are too impracticable. The importance of the composition of the reengineering team to creating effective process
designs is included in the following statement as a necessary condition:
SS2: Effective redesign of processes can be accomplished only if a
balanced team undertakes redesign.
THE SOCIOTECHNICAL THEORY OF REDESIGN
The sociotechnical theory-in-use, also referred to as the emergent perspective, focuses on “the dynamic interplay between the actors, context, and technology”
(Markus and Robey 1988, p. 588). This perspective attempts to achieve a balance
between the technologically oriented and the socially oriented views by adopting
interactional assumptions regarding (or explanations for) organizational outcome.
Mumford (1995), a prominent proponent of sociotechnical thinking, sees no fundamental difference between the way sociotechnical design and business process
redesign is undertaken. This is evident from the following statement (Mumford
1995, p. 202):
Today, business process reengineering is being hailed as an entirely
new approach to efficiency improvement. However, it is difficult to see
how it differs from socio-technical design. In fact, the first major sociotechnical design experiment might now be seen as a classic example
of process re-engineering although it had as its principal goal the
improvement of working conditions rather than high production.
Another important aspect of the socio-technical perspective is that it argues
that specific organizational outcomes arising from the introduction of technology in
any pre-existing social system tend to “surface” depending on a number of situational factors. Scholars and practitioners adopting this perspective thus see specific
organizational outcomes inherently as less predictable than do those who adopt the
sociocentric or the technocentric perspective (Markus and Robey 1988).
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Recursive Understanding of the IT-Social System Relationship
Within the sociotechnical perspective, the redesign of business processes
can be accomplished only with a proper understanding of the capabilities and limitations of IT, and of the business process requirements that are embedded within
social contexts (Davenport and Short 1991; Markus and Robey 1995). In the words
of Manganelli and Klein (1994, p. 157), “Social design must be performed in conjunction with technical design: the social and technical components of a process
must be congruent if the process is to be effective.” This belief holds that redesign
is driven neither by technology nor by the current understanding of the business
process within the existing social fabric in the organization—rather a “joint optimization” is needed (Cherns 1976). The redesign process must involve the discovery
of the requirements and process configurations not previously understood in light
of new technological options available, and should also prompt the search for technologies that serve the emerging requirements (discovered during the course of the
design process) in an efficient and effective manner. It must be recognized that
while a consideration of both the social and the technical are seen as necessary,
sociotechnical redesign need not always involve a simultaneous redesign of both
the social and the technical systems. Instead, redesign often proceeds in a sequential fashion, the technical first followed by the social, or vice versa, as explained by
Markus and Robey (1995, p. 602-603), who refer to this sociotechnical approach as
“recursive-sequential design”:
In this approach, one design dimension implicitly dominates the
others. The dominant dimension usually reflects the designer’s primary expertise or speciality....The dominant dimension is designed
first, becoming the “fixed” or center point around which all other elements are designed; the other dimensions are tailored to match it.
To summarize, the key to effective redesign is the creation of a “fit” between
information technology, and the human resources and strategic objectives underlying the business process, by changing the technical and social components
related to the focal business process either simultaneously or sequentially (Daven-
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port and Short 1990; Grover and Kettinger 2000; Markus and Robey 1995). Thus,
we have the statement STS1 (SocioTechnical Statement 1):
STS1:

Effective redesign of processes can be accomplished only if an
understanding of both the IT and the business processes within
the social context is used during redesign.

Enhancing Functional Coupling
An approach used by practitioners that is consistent with sociotechnical
thinking, has been articulated by Teng et al. (1994) and, thereafter, by Grover et al.
(1995b) as the “functional coupling” framework. Teng et al. conceptualize
organizations as having processes comprised of work-units/functions that have
different types and degrees of functional coupling among them. Functional coupling
of a process refers to the “way in which various functions are orchestrated while
participating in a particular business process” (Grover et al. 1995b, p. 17). Functional coupling may be assumed to have two dimensions: the degree of physical
coupling and the degree of information coupling. Physical coupling of a business
process refers to the extent of flow of tangible input and output (e.g., physical
objects, hand-off documents) among participating functions. A high degree of
physical coupling of a business process implies that it is composed of functions in
a serial or sequential order; a low degree of physical coupling implies parallelism
among functions constituting the business process. The degree of information
coupling refers to the extent of information exchange between two functions participating in a business process. Based on the frequency and intensity of information
interchange, functions in a business process may be classified as insulated (involving low frequency/intensity of information exchange) or collaborative (involving
high frequency/intensity). Combining the extreme ends of the two dimensions of
functional coupling, one may classify processes as serial-insulated, serial-collaborative, parallel-insulated, and parallel collaborative (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: The Functional Coupling Framework (Grover et al. 1995)
Traditional functionally oriented business organizations have serial-insulated
processes embedded in them (Teng et al. 1994; Davenport 1993). Thus, most redesign endeavors attempt to move organizations’ processes diagonally from region I
to region IV by reducing physical coupling and simultaneously increasing information coupling.
The proponents of this framework also discuss how communication and
shared-resource technologies as well as organizational or social enablers such as
cross-functional teams, case management, and specific organizational structures
jointly act as catalysts to enhance the functional coupling among organizational
units (Davenport and Nohria 1994; Grover et al. 1995; Teng et al. 1994). We note,
however, based on the arguments of Markus and Robey (1995) presented earlier
in the discussion of STS1, that the technical and the social catalysts may be applied
sequentially or simultaneously. Based on the above discussion, we have the following statement:
STS2:

Effective redesign of a process can occur only if the redesigners
seek to enhance the functional coupling in the business process
through the use of technological as well as social enablers.
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We have identified and offered three theories-in-use through our reading of
the practitioner-oriented literature on business process redesign. We know of no
previous effort by academic scholars to infer and articulate formal statements capturing the underlying theories-in-use on redesign from the BPR literature, but such
an effort would be welcome as another study with which to triangulate the findings
of the current study. Our derivation of the propositions within the three theoretical
perspectives allows us to proceed with Argyris’s notion of good science, where we
subject these practitioners’ theories-in-use as reflected in the literature “to the most
rigorous tests available” (quoted earlier). We now discuss our methodology.
III. CASE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994, p. 13). The importance of
case studies within the organizational studies and information systems disciplines
has been recognized (e.g., Eisenhardt 1989; Markus 1997). While case studies are
usually associated with the interpretivist tradition (e.g. Orlikowski 1992; Walsham
and Sahay 1999; Walsham and Waema 1994), some have been undertaken from
the positivist tradition as well (Benbasat et al. 1987; Lee 1989, Markus 1983; Paré
and Elam 1997; Yin 1994). Neither approach is inherently superior to the other, and
each is appropriate for different research objectives (Lee 1991). We adopt the positivist approach in our study and use a single, critical case design (Yin 1994).10
Below, we provide the gist of the positivist case research methodology.

10

According to Yin (1994, pp. 38-39), “One rationale for a single case is when it represents
the critical case in testing a well-formulated theory [in our case, theory-in-use]. The single case can...
be used to determine whether a theory’s propositions are correct or whether some alternative set of
explanations might be more relevant. In this manner... the single case can represent a significant
contribution to knowledge and theory-building. Such a study can even help to refocus future
investigations in an entire field.” We discuss how our site satisfied criteria of “critical case” in the
subsection on external validity.
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A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE POSITIVIST CASE STUDY
METHODOLOGY FOR THEORY TESTING
There are many accounts of positivism in the history of science and a comprehensive discussion of positivism is beyond the scope of this paper. Our conception of positivism is consistent with the views expressed by contemporary scholars
in the fields of anthropology (Schweizer 1998), sociology (Ackroyd and Hughes
1992), organizational studies (Eisenhardt 1989; Lee 1991), and information systems
(Lee 1989; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). This view of positivism represents a
“marriage” of three traditions: (1) the empiricist tradition, which sought “the foundation of human knowledge in indubitable experience of the external world,” and thus
relies on “publicly verifiable, observable sensory data, systematically collected and
collated, as the route to knowledge” (Ackroyd and Hughes 1992, pp. 21-22); (2) the
rationalist tradition, which argued that “the route to indubitable knowledge is not
through empirical experience of the empirical world, but through logical, that is
rational principles which are beyond doubt” (p. 23); and (3) the critical rationalist tradition, whose primary proponent, Karl Popper, “concluded that positive evidence
(‘confirmation’) and the inductive method (the search for rules that lead from limited
observations to the establishment of valid generalizations) are not at the heart of
science. Rather, negative evidence (‘falsification’) and deduction are at the core”
(Schweizer 1998, p. 44). Arising out of this synthesis is hypothetico-deductive logic,
which is viewed as being central to the world of positivist research today (Lee 1999).
In the words of Ackroyd and Hughes (1992, p. 23), the hypothetico-deductive model
uses the general statements of the theory as premises in a deductive
argument, along with statements describing the conditions under
which the test is carried out, [and] a testable conclusion, or prediction,
[that] can be deduced and compared with empirical evidence. If the
conclusion and evidence do not match, then the theory is falsified; if
they do match, then this is some evidential support for the theory and
its explanation. Subsequent research will then be devoted to determining its range of applicability and subjecting it to still further tests.
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Our case research methodology is based on the view of positivism described
above. The empiricist influence is reflected in the procedures for ensuring systematic documentation and the rigor of the research process, drawing mainly on Yin
(1994). The rationalist and the critical rationalist traditions are reflected in the use
of “pattern matching” to deductively test falsifiable statements derived from the
literature.
A DISCUSSION ON THE RIGOR OF THE STUDY
In this subsection, we discuss how our case study addresses the requirements of the positivist case study method set forth by noted methodologists.
Construct Validity
Yin (1994) suggests three tactics to improve construct validity:
Using multiple sources of evidence: According to Yin (1994, p. 92), the
use of multiple data sources can contribute to a high degree of construct validity,
since “multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the
same phenomenon.” Specifically, for the MANCO11 case study, conducted in 199697, we interviewed 17 key stakeholders of the reengineering initiative (Table 2),
attended several meetings such as redesign sessions, “conference room pilot
meetings” and “Monday morning meetings,” and informally interacted with several
stakeholders. In addition, the MIS manager gave us access to several documents,
which related to: (1) the company background and its products; (2) the current
reengineering project; and (3) a smaller version of the current project undertaken
approximately two years prior to MANCO’s BPR effort.

11

MANCO is a pseudonym for the organization studied.
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Table 2. Interview Statistics

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Interviewee
CEO
Senior VP
Plant Manager
MIS Manager
Systems Analyst
Quality Assurance Manager
Production Planning
Manager
HR Manager
Purchasing agent
Engineering Manager
Accountant
Manufacturing Engineer

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Productivity Facilitator
Consultant (ERP Vendor)
Consultant (Academic)
Sales Administrator
Exports Coordinator

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Number of
formal
Interviews
1
1
2
3
2
2
5
1
2
2
1
Requested, didn’t
materialize
3
1
0
1
1

Number of Informal Interviews pertaining to redesign (including telephone interviews/
conversations)
0
2
Few
Several
Few
0
Several
0
2
Few
0
1
Several
2
Several
1
1

The sampling strategy utilized in acquiring as well as utilizing data for deductive testing was not random but purposeful (Patton 1990). Sampling of data within
the MANCO case study was used throughout the period of the study with two main
goals in mind: to obtain new information about a construct of interest and to enhance confidence in the measurement of the construct through constant triangulation. In particular, four purposeful strategies outlined by Patton (p. 182-183) were
utilized:
•

Criterion sampling—This involved selecting interviewees and deciding on
questions for interviewees based on some pre-determined criteria. For
example, during the study, in order to assess the role of MANCO’s leadership during the initiative, it was important to have an opportunity to interview
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with the CEO as well as the senior vice president. Similarly, in assessing the
effectiveness of the redesign initiative, it was important to identify and interview a broad range of stakeholders who were influencing the redesign or
were likely to be influenced by it.
•

Theory-based or operational construct sampling—This involved picking
appropriate interviewees and/or segments of their interviews, as well as
documentary evidence (such as redesign team organization charts) pertinent
to constructs such as “balanced team” that were being “measured” to test a
theory-in-use.

•

Chain sampling—This became a useful strategy for identifying additional
interviewees whom other informants viewed as having useful insights
regarding the issues in which the researchers were interested.

•

Opportunistic sampling—Because of the dynamic nature of the fieldwork, any
emergent opportunity for conversing with stakeholders had to be exploited
to the fullest. In this case study, in addition to formal interviews for which
appointments were sought, useful data was gathered by sitting in on the
Monday morning meetings whenever possible, by conversing with employees, including shop floor workers in the company cafeteria about their
views on the BPR initiative, interviewing external consultants about their view
of MANCO’s initiative as compared with other organizations whenever they
appeared to be taking a break, and also gaining an understanding of many
“inside” issues during an informal dinner at the home of one of the key
redesigners.
Having key informants review the case study report: Yin (1994, p. 146)

discusses such a review:
From a methodological viewpoint, the corrections made through this
process will enhance the accuracy of the case study, hence increasing the construct validity of the study. In addition, where no
objective truth may exist…the procedure should help to identify the
various perspectives, which can then be represented in the case
study report.
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Two individuals—the MIS manager and an academic consultant, both of whom had
an overall understanding of the project—agreed to review the entire case study
draft. The MIS manager wrote the following memo to the first author of this study
after carefully examining the case study:
I think this is excellent. You have captured the overall spirit of what
has happened here over the last several years. The changes I’ve indicated are mostly to “disguise” some of the players’ names.
The consultant similarly indicated to us that the case-study was an in-depth and
accurate portrayal of the MANCO situation. In addition, throughout the research process, facts presented in the case were corroborated through other forms of “member checking” (Erlandson et al. 1993; Trauth 1997) using triangulation tactics such
as (1) verifying interpretations and data gathered in earlier interviews in the course
of the interviews and (2) furnishing copies of various sections of the report (including
the first author’s emerging pictorial reconstructions of the custom order-processing
business process) to various stakeholders, and requesting written/oral commentaries or feedback.
Maintaining a chain of evidence: In order to ensure construct validity and
reliability, Yin (1994) recommends that a case study be constructed such that a
reader or external observer would be able to trace the chain of events occurring in
the case study. This concern was addressed by creating a detailed processual
narrative of the case study, as proposed by Paré and Elam (1997), prior to testing
the statements. Such a detailed narrative can provide the reader with a sense of the
sequence of events that led to a particular outcome from the point of origin, and
thus can allow the reader to make an independent judgment regarding the validity
and reliability of measures of constructs used in the case study. For example, in
trying to measure if the redesign at MANCO was technocentric, a reader of this
case study does not need to rely merely on the authors’ measurement, but can
independently follow the chain of events described in the narrative—the change in
structure and culture, the collection of requirements from different functional units,
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consolidation and creation of criteria for selection of enabling software, development
of a preliminary process vision, presentation of technology solutions by vendors,
evolution of the redesigned processes with the understanding of technological
options and limitations, etc.—to evaluate the authors’ conclusion that the redesign
at MANCO was not technocentric.
Internal Validity
Only with internal validity can it be inferred that “a relationship between two
variables is causal or that the absence of a relationship implies the absence of
cause” (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 37). According to Yin (1994), pattern matching
may be used to enhance the internal validity. This technique essentially involves
qualitative but logical deduction (Lee 1989) wherein an empirically based pattern is
compared against a predicted pattern derived from rival theoretical perspectives
(e.g., Markus 1983). Yin (1993, p. 60) underscores the importance of pattern
matching using rival theories:
I have found no concept more helpful in conducting research than the
concept of rival theories….The most common rival theory has been
the null hypothesis. A null hypothesis is simply the absence of target
hypothesis. In an experiment, the target hypothesis might be a
significant relationship between two variables, and the null hypothesis
would be the absence of this relationship (the existence of the
phenomena “by chance” alone). However, for doing case studies, the
best rival is not simply the absence of target theory or hypothesis.
Instead, the best rival would be a rival theory, attempting to explain
the same outcome but with a different substantive theory than that of
the target theory or hypothesis.
Also, according to Yin (1994), the rival theoretical perspectives need to be sufficiently distinct, such that there is little overlap among the “independent variables”
in the rival propositions/statements. In our study, each of the three rival theoretical
perspectives indicated different “independent variables” or conditions for effective
redesign. For example, according to the technocentric theory-in-use, Hammer and
Champy’s notion of “inductive thinking” or a technology-driven design approach is
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seen as a necessary condition for effective redesign; according to the sociocentric
theory-in-use, the (pre-)existence of a leader’s vision regarding the reengineered
process is seen as a necessary condition for effective redesign; and finally, for the
sociotechnical theory-in-use, effective redesign is possible only if the recursive
relationship between the business processes and IT is recognized and used to
inform the process of redesign. Having identified the “independent variables,” we
then conducted the case study to collect data not in a random way but, as Patton
(1990) suggests, in a “purposive” way to identify material pertinent to the statements
of the competing theories-in-use.
External Validity
This type of validity pertains to the generalizability of the findings (Light et al.
1990). In this study, we show that the events and behavioral patterns occurring at
MANCO, the site of an intensive examination of a BPR initiative, do not match the
patterns predicted by statements of (for example) the technocentric theory-in-use.
It is important to note that in this study we are interested in deductive generalization
as opposed to inductive generalization (Baskerville and Lee 1999) and, therefore,
the criterion of generalizability is to be applied to the statements (or theories-in-use)
that we are testing, and not to the case study. In other words, one of the questions
we ask ourselves is, “Is the technocentric theory of redesign generalizable?”12 The
empirical material from the MANCO case in refuting this theory-in-use, as we see
in the following section, demonstrates that the technocentric theory on redesign
cannot be considered generalizable. In the hypothetico-deductive logic of positivism
(described earlier in this section), a single empirical refutation is sufficient to falsify,
or at the very least, raise serious doubts regarding the status of generalizability of
a theory (Ackroyd and Hughes 1992; Lee 1989). In this regard, the use of one case
is similar to the use of one experiment, in that one instance of either method is suffi-

12

We ask a similar question with respect to the alternate sociocentric and sociotechnical
theories-in-use as well.
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cient to reject or disprove statements being tested.13 However, for such disconfirmation to be truly convincing, Markus (1989) suggests the use of two strategies in
selecting a “critical” case: First, the case selected should “be representative of a
presumably large class of cases that fits the requirements of theory or theories to
be tested” (p. 24). This guideline is also referred to by Patton (1990, p. 173) as a
“typical case” sampling criterion. This criterion is satisfied in the case of MANCO,
which was described by middle and top management of the company, the BASYS14
vendor, and external consultants as undertaking a major reengineering initiative,
thereby making it a suitable site to examine theory or theories of business process
redesign. Indeed, the authors gained entry into MANCO based on the match
between the company’s initiative and the stated goals of the research project (which
was to study BPR). The description of the project also matched, to a great extent,
definitions of BPR available in the then current literature on this topic. Also, a
BASYS consultant stated in an interview that the package chosen “allows you to
rethink your processes and rethink the way you are doing things… it is a package
that can support reengineering within a corporation,” thus indicating that MANCO’s
initiative involved redesign of business processes and their implementation. Finally,
there is no reason to believe that MANCO was a unique organization based on its
product line, mixed-mode manufacturing strategy, the inter-functional feuds, and
islands of information. In fact, the latter two characteristics were quite common
among companies that chose to undertake BPR around that time, making MANCO
a fairly “typical” case for studying BPR.15 Thus, following Markus (1989), we argue
that while it is not possible to estimate exactly how many organizations MANCO

13

We note that, epistemologically speaking, statements cannot be conclusively proved to be
true (Lee 1989; Yin 1994). Of course, based on a number of empirical validations of statements
derived from a theory, a consensus regarding the generalizability of a theory may be reached within
a community of researchers or practitioners.
14

A pseudonym for the software selected for BPR at MANCO.

15

In this regard, we realize that the size of MANCO would make it more representative of
small/mid-sized companies than of large corporations.
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might be representative of, there is no reason to believe that testing theories in
MANCO would provide absolutely unique and unrepresentative results.
The second strategy that Markus suggests is that the chosen case should be
very likely to confirm the main theory of interest. In such a case, if the theory fails,
the disconfirmation can be considered decisive (Markus 1989; Patton 1990). In our
study, the main theory of interest was the technocentric theory-in-use (with sociocentric and sociotechnical theories-in-use being the “alternate” or rival perspectives). An examination of MANCO’s profile suggests that the company was likely to
adopt a technocentric point of view in its BPR effort. The company was founded and
led by engineers, and it was fundamentally engaged in designing and manufacturing
air purification technology, thereby making the overall culture of the company technology-oriented, if not technocentric. In addition, the fact that the redesign initiative
was headed by the MIS manager, who had been primarily in-charge of technical
(hardware and software) issues of the company, would further point toward the
strong possibility of MANCO adopting a technocentric approach to redesign. Thus,
if it could be established that MANCO experienced effective redesign but did not
adopt a technocentric approach or discontinued a technocentric approach that it
had initially adopted, the disconfirmation of the technocentric theory-in-use would
become all the more decisive.
Reliability
The underlying concern of reliability is “whether the process of study is consistent, reasonably stable over time and across researchers and methods” (Miles
and Huberman 1994, p. 278). Yin suggests two tactics to ensure reliability of the
study: creation of the case study protocol and development of a case study
database.
Case study protocol: This protocol guides the investigator in conducting
case study research in a standardized manner. The protocol for the study, created
in accordance with Yin’s guidelines (1994), consisted of the following documents:
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1.

A one page pre-proposal outlining the objective of the study and the type of
access to data required for completion of the study.

2.

A broad description of the envisioned research report with chapter by chapter
summaries of the proposed contents.

3.

An 80 page proposal consisting of the research question, literature review,
derivation of competing theoretical statements, description of the epistemology and methodology to be adopted, a brief description of case study sites,
and a list of relevant readings.

4.

An evolving set of questionnaire outlines used to guide interviews.
Development of case study database: Yin recommends that a case study

database have the following four components: case study notes, case study documents, tabular material, and a case study narrative.
Our case study notes primarily consisted of hand-written notes on the margins of the interview transcripts or on the questionnaires used for interviewing.
These notes highlighted important points that were relevant to the statements being
tested and, occasionally, provided cross-references to other interviews referring to
the same issues. Our case study documents included key interview questionnaires,
transcripts of some of the interviews, company background information, and projectrelated documents. Our tabular material included a profile of MANCO’s products,
summary of all statements to be tested, and the results of the testing. The central
component of the case study database was, however, our case study narrative, also
called an interim case summary by Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 274), which
attempted to synthesize information from all of the different sources gathered up to
that point. This interim summary allowed the representation, with some coherence,
of the sequence of events that occurred in the organization and facilitated meaningful discussion with, and validation by, stakeholders of the case study. This 35 page
chronological description of events and processes at MANCO served as the main
data input for the deductive testing, supplemented by some additional transcribed
quotations from the taped interviews.

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

31

Other Concerns
In addition to following the guidelines mentioned above, and consistent with
the empiricist ideal of eliminating “speculative assumptions not founded on observation” (Schweizer 1998, p. 44), we adopted a realist ontology as described by Van
Maanen (1988) rather than a social constructivist (Walsham and Sahay 1999) or an
impressionist perspective (Harvey 1997; Van Maanen 1988), focusing on what
organizational participants said or did, rather than on what (we thought) they meant
through our interpretation of symbols.
Finally, we used the following post hoc evaluation criteria for positivist case
studies based on Popper’s ideas of falsifiability, logical consistency, survival, and
relative explanatory power (Lee 1991). In our case study, we stated propositions in
a falsifiable form (and some propositions were actually falsified). The propositions
within the three perspectives were consistent with one-another. Our case study was
also able to rule out certain theories-in-use (the technocentric and the sociocentric
theories of redesign). However, the study found evidence in favor of the sociotechnical theory-in-use of redesign, thereby showing that the sociotechnical theory had
higher explanatory power than the others.
It is worth noting at this point that most authors of positivist studies write in
the third person, but we boldly use the first-person in this study in order to call attention to our belief that even a positivist scientific theory cannot exist independently
of knowing subjects and, instead, must be part of an on-going social activity. By
writing in the first person, we also intend to emphasize that our voice is distinct from
the voices of the people whom we interviewed, and that the interview quotations
that we are choosing to present therefore necessarily also reflect our own interests
as IS researchers, not just the interests of the interviewees themselves. At the same
time, by intentionally and extensively exposing our reasoning and evidence, we
intend to be enabling our fellow researchers to assess our voice and to conduct
subsequent studies to replicate, challenge, or otherwise build upon our study in a
cumulative scientific fashion. For instance, another researcher could perform
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another positivist study, but at a different organizational site, and then present evidence (including interview data) consistent with or contradictory to ours, or another
researcher could use our findings of refuted statements as the basis on which to
motivate a subsequent interpretive study in the manner explained by Lee (1991).
IV. THE CASE STUDY: THE COMPANY AND
ITS PRE-BPR SITUATION16
In this section, we provide a description of the company (MANCO) that we
intensively studied and, as a background to empirical testing, show why MANCO
was interested in BPR. For easy reference, we have summarized key points of
MANCO’s reengineering initiative in Table 3.
INTRODUCTION
Two visionary engineers, Tom Martin and Bill Robinson, foreseeing the increasing demands for high quality air purification equipment world-wide, co-founded
MANCO in the mid-1960s. From its humble beginnings in a garage with six employees, MANCO, in the next 30 years, had grown to a well-established organization
with an impressive array of products whose world-wide yearly sales were over $25
million. Most of the 250 employees of MANCO were located at the headquarters in
a major city in the midwest region of the United States; the remaining employees
were stationed at regional offices in the U.S. and in subsidiaries in Great Britain,
Germany, and Australia. MANCO’s strategy for remaining competitive in its worldwide market was based on the principles of product differentiation and customer
service. The distribution strategy was multifaceted, reflecting the variety of product
lines. The company used a mixed mode manufacturing strategy: make-to-stock,
assemble-to-order, and make-to-order. Production planning was an important component in the manufacturing process since the bills-of-material varied between three
and seven levels for different products, and over 80% of the orders were for product

16

The names of the stakeholders and the organization have been disguised.
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configurations that had been previously built by the company. Over its three decades of operation, MANCO had earned considerable repute in the air pollution and
dust collection industries.

Furthermore, the increasing international concern on

environmental issues such as air pollution ensured a growing market for MANCO’s
products. In addition, competition in the industry was moderate and, overall,
MANCO’s prospects appeared excellent from the external market’s point of view.
Table 3. MANCO Case Summary
ORGANIZATION
CHARACTERISTICS
Age as of 1996
Industry
Size (before reengineering)
Culture (before reengineering)
Size/Revenue (after reengineering)
Culture (after reengineering)
REENGINEERING:
The “definition-in-use” of reengineering
Reason for reengineering
Goals of the initiative

Nature of the reengineering process
Formal definition of success
PROCESS REDESIGN:
Nature of the redesign process
Nature of the vision (redesign)

30 years approximately
Air purification equipment
250 approximately
Fragmented, inter-functional hostility, politically
charged, task-oriented, narrow compartmentalized
thinking, sluggish action
Same headcount (i.e., no change); revenue increased
considerably
Agile, cheerful, cross-functional cooperation
“Organizational reform” for excellence using commonsense and IT
To avoid “extended mediocrity”
To excel and take advantage of market opportunities
by creating an agile and efficient organization. The
intermediate goals included redesign and implementation of appropriate organization structure, business
process, and enabling technology.
Radical, structural reorganization, followed by ITenabled process change, followed by incremental
adjustments of the social organization and technology
Cross-functional integration, creation of useable
information for effective management
Autocratic changes in the structure, followed by
participative, iterative redesign
Organizational agility was the broad vision articulated
by the top management; vision for specific processes
evolved through interactions of different social/
functional options with different technical options. The
redesigned processes were not formally represented
on paper, but shared in the minds of the team and
close associates.
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Primary role of top management in the
redesign
Role of the consultants

Role of the redesign team
Role of IT envisaged
Role of computerized BPR tools for
process modeling
Whether redesign was seen by
stakeholders as effective
IMPLEMENTATION:
Nature of the implementation process
Nature of communication

Nature of IT implementation
management
Nature of pre-existing IT infrastructure
Role of top management
Main problems faced in implementation
Morale during implementation
Whether the implementation was being
seen as successful by stakeholders

Created structural and cultural context for effective
cross-functional processes; complete support
provided to reengineering team throughout
Virtually no role in initial phase of structural and
cultural change; in the latter phase involving redesign,
the consultants from BASYS played a supportive role
in helping the redesign team to see the possibilities
offered by the software package, and facilitate the
customization of the software package to the redesigned processes (implementation).
To discover business processes and the human
organization suitable for the company. Also
responsible for implementation
Providing a set of tools, accelerated information
sharing, detailed management information
Limited; use of tools discontinued during redesign
Yes, for the most part

Extremely planned; three pilots
Superficial (sometimes misleading) formal communication. (For example, potentially negative effects of
reengineering were systematically omitted from the
discussion with employees by management during
company-wide profit-sharing meetings.)
Very systematic
Poor
Complete support; senior VP had hands-on
involvement
Moving to a more sophisticated IT infrastructure
High overall
Yes

Unfortunately, the organization itself had become increasingly dysfunctional
over the years. Customer complaints were on the rise, and it was as if MANCO had
lost the ability to listen and correct problems. In order to secure bookings, the Sales
department was promising customers delivery dates that, in fact, were unachievable. In addition, the Sales personnel were often booking orders without accurate
specifications— practice that further delayed engineering design and manufacturing
activities, and consequently the shipping of the product. The Engineering function
did not appear to have the time or the interest to produce or update drawings and
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documents that Manufacturing needed to fabricate and assemble ordered products
correctly. There were often errors in engineering designs and design modifications
because of a lack of coordination between the electrical and mechanical engineering groups. Meanwhile, the Manufacturing function was in a state of constant
battle with Engineering regarding issues of ownership and update rights to bill-ofmaterial and routing information, to mention a few. There was clearly no sharing of
information among the functional areas. Symptoms of these problems had started
to manifest themselves as unreasonable lead-times, as a high proportion of rework
necessary, and as deteriorating quality of products.
THE DIAGNOSIS
According to employees of MANCO who were interviewed, the company’s
ailments originated from five areas: functional leadership, organizational structure,
organizational culture, information technology infrastructure, and inefficient business
processes.
Leadership, Structure and Culture
There was a serious problem with MANCO’s functional leadership, especially
at the VP (vice president) level. The VPs had served the organization well in its
early years; however, as the organization continued to grow, they built “inward
looking” empires with insurmountable territorial walls. These walls made coordination among different stages of the business processes a nightmare. The present
plant manager recalled:
We were all focused inward at being the best we could be...and we
began to all focus on local goals as opposed to global goals....No one
VP [was] in charge of an entire operation...they were in-charge of
segments...and so [they] had a lot of gridlock...and the symptom of
that was animosity between the factory and Sales, between Sales
and Engineering, between Engineering and Manufacturing...so we all
became very territorial.

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

36

A consultant who was at that time attempting to improve MANCO’s marketingoperations interface, soon realized that the fundamental barrier to such an improvement was the nature of relationship among the VPs. Within the fragmented and
hostile environment that the VPs created and maintained, there could be no trust
across functional areas, and hence, no chance of cross-functional cooperation. One
of the frustrating symptoms that the consultant encountered during his work with
MANCO was the futility of the VP level meetings:
I thought these meetings were supposed to be strategic in nature. In
reality, these turned out to be finger-pointing sessions...every time...
where insignificant operational issues were angrily debated....even
those issues were often not resolved.
The organizational structure (see Figure 2) also contributed to this territorial attitude.
The vice presidents were all at the same level and wielded almost equal power in
the organization. They also had comparable influence on the person who was
president and CEO. This person had historically given his VPs as much autonomy
as possible to enable them to carry out their duties without unnecessary constraints
or interference from others.
PRESIDENT & CEO

VP (Engineering)

ENGINEERING
MANAGER

VP (Operations)

MIS MANAGER

VP (Finance)

PURCHASING
MANAGER

VP
(International
Sales)

MANUFACTURING
ENGINEERING
MANAGER

MAINTENANCE
MANAGER

VP (Sales)

SALES
MANAGER

Figure 2. Simplified Management Structure of MANCO
Before the Reengineering Initiative
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Territorialism had also emerged on the shop floor with foremen controlling
different groups of workers assigned to different specialized activities or products.
Foremen were concerned only with their own local goals, and created a similar
inward focus among their subordinates, the hourly workers. The plant manager
described the situation as follows:
We had a lot of territorial disputes about floor space, about machinery, about people...resources. One group would not share their
resources with another. If [an] assembly department did not have any
work to do, their foreman would give them make-work projects...clean
the shelves, sweep the floor...do whatever...he never asked another
foreman if he could use some help.
The existing organizational culture legitimized unproductive mindsets such
as “they screwed up,” “this is not our job,” and “engineers should be on their drawing
boards, not on the manufacturing floor.” On the shop floor, there was little ownership of work because of the fragmented nature of the manufacturing work-force
working on different parts of a product. Workers were expected to accomplish
structured tasks specified by supervisors, and most of them did what they were told
in (what the HR manager termed as) a “brain dead” fashion. The focus of workers
was on clocking the desired number of hours rather than on adding value to the
company’s activities through active participation and involvement or through creation of a defect-free product that would be appreciated by the customers. Also, most
employees were hardly aware of or concerned about the “bigger picture”—the overall performance of MANCO.
Information Technology
In addition to problems in leadership, organizational structure, and organizational culture, MANCO had serious concerns about its existing information technology. A senior manager commented that “to exploit the market opportunity we are
positioned in,” MANCO had to ensure that “we don’t have anything in our way, such
as the archaic computer system. We literally struggle to put together information
that most companies can hit a button [for].” Even the MIS manager had her doubts
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regarding MANCO’s existing systems, especially the hardware, wondering if it was
not “too dangerous to be on something that if something broke, it wasn’t able to be
fixed.”
MANCO’s primary computer system was a minicomputer, acquired more than
15 years previous to the BPR effort, when it was considered the state-of-the-art; it
ran an MRP package with inventory control, product structure, purchasing and
receiving modules, and several in-house developed modules for functions such as
order-entry, invoicing, lead processing, financials, labor reporting, Kanban replenishment, sales analysis, sales history, bookings analysis, territory management, sales
force tracking, and customer returns tracking. The minicomputer served 60 terminals and 20 printers all around the manufacturing and office facility. The system
supported flat-files and had no relational DBMS capabilities, which seriously constrained the ability of the MIS department to make ad hoc reports available for
management decision making. Reports generated through the applications often did
not have up-to-date relevant information. Also, the large number of reports tended
to create information overload for many users. Fortunately for the MIS department,
top management as well as colleagues from other departments realized that these
inadequacies primarily resulted from the poor technological infrastructure and lack
of state-of-the-art software tools rather than from any deficiency of the information
systems personnel. Most organizational members appeared to have a positive
disposition toward the MIS department, and considered the MIS manager to be a
competent individual. The Quality Assurance manager, for example, described her
as a “real authority” whose judgments and insights were well respected by all.
Word processing at MANCO used WordPerfect 5.1, which ran on a UNIXbased Compaq network. MANCO had also acquired a number of IBM PC compatibles in the immediately preceding few years, and these personal computers
(PCs) were either connected to departmental Novell-based Local Area Networks
(e.g., supporting CAD/CAM in the Engineering department, or running Human
Resources applications), or existed as stand-alone machines shared by a few
people in a particular department. These PCs handled the functions of supporting
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contact management, customer complaints tracking, engineering drawings, scheduling, word-processing, spreadsheets and some local database management. A
systems analyst described the company’s situation as follows:
What we have now is...several systems that can speak to each other
with much difficulty, and often not at all.
In his opinion, MANCO consisted of “islands of information” with “no real connectivity”; this explained MANCO’s problems of data redundancy, lack of data integrity,
and difficulties in data sharing and integration.
Another problem arising from the absence of a fully networked information
system with database capabilities was the sea of redundant paperwork in MANCO.
The vast amount of paper was slowing down the entire organization and frustrating
employees who, burdened by paper-management functions, hardly had time to
focus on their “real jobs.” Comments such as “I do a lot of copying,” “I generate a
lot of paperwork.” and “We need a system that will eliminate paperwork” were
common across the organization’s functions and levels. A purchasing agent talked
at length about the problems of inter-departmental information exchange through
using paper rather than through accessing an on-line database system:
Our current system does not do a lot of back and forth communication
within some of the departments....Engineering is a stand alone
department as far as we are concerned...we don’t get back a lot of
information from them...we don’t have on-line capability to acquire
drawings, give information back to Engineering in a timely fashion, or
look for some of their plans in terms of design and development that
is going on. There is a lot of paperwork shuffling through our current
Engineering chains…everything that they do they have to funnel us
a piece of paperwork before we actually get into the system and
realize what is going on...I think we are going to gain a lot across the
company in terms of a shared database.
It was clear to all perceptive organizational members that information systems (IS)
were a key to MANCO’s future success in the global market place.
In summary, a radical change was needed in this area to eliminate or minimize problems of communication and coordination, data redundancy, lack of data
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integrity, lack of data integration, excessive paperwork, the inability to provide
required management information within a short period, and finally, the inefficiency
of certain business processes. Only then could MANCO hope to remain competitive
in the coming years.
MANCO’s Business Processes
Like most other companies, MANCO had several traditional business processes: order-processing, manufacturing, credit approval, product design, etc. In
this case study, we focus primarily on custom order processing, which extends
across a number of functional areas. We offer a simplified diagram showing information flows within custom order processing (Figure 317) that we constructed based
on interviews with different stakeholder. Formal lines of communication or information exchange are represented using solid lines while informal lines are represented
using dotted lines. The focal process may be described as follows: Sales agents
would bring orders to the Sales department. The Sales department would primarily
have two functions at this point: first, to make the commission payable to the agent
for the order; and second, to make copies of the order and forward one copy
(referred to as the production copy) to Production Planning and another copy
(referred to as the shipper) to Accounting. On receiving the shipper, Accounting
would initiate a credit-check18 on the customer. Only if and when satisfactory credit
status of the customer could be ascertained would the shipper be passed to Production Planning from Accounting. Meanwhile, the production copy would have
reached Production Planning, which would then be examining the order and
sending a memo back to Sales with the estimated shipping date. If Sales and Pro17

The diagrams (Figures 3, 5, and 6) do not depict the detailed process steps, but instead,
show the information flows among the functional units that were manifestations of the underlying
processes at different stages of the initiative, from the interviewees’ points of view. This representation, while not using notations often used in BPR, can help the reader visualize, without introducing
unnecessary details, the problems at MANCO and how the redesign, when implemented, would help
make MANCO efficient and effective.
18

This credit check could take up to 21 days.
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duction Planning were not in agreement regarding the shipping date, several
memos would be exchanged before any mutually acceptable date could be
finalized.
PURCHASING

ACCOUNTING
Shipper (Credit
Approved)
1a:
Shipper
O
R
D
E
R

SALES

6. Purchasing
Delivery
Information

2. Memo containing estimated ship date
Negotiation and
coordination memos
1b: Production copy of the order
3. Order + Custom Items Marked

ENGINEERING

5. Purchase
Requisition

PRODUCTION
PLANNING

Memos
4. Material
Releases

7. Planning Guide +
Schedule + Purchase
Delivery Dates + Shipper

MANUFACURING
SHIPPED
GOODS

Note: The dotted lines represent informal communication among the functional units.

Figure 3. Custom Order Processing at MANCO
Before the Reengineering Initiative
When the shipper (credit approved) would finally arrive at Production
Planning, the production copy of the order would be forwarded to the Engineering
department which was required to provide releases (i.e.,revised bill-of-materials and
drawings) as soon as possible so that Manufacturing could meet the shipping date.
When Production Planning received the releases from Engineering, Production
Planning would first issue a purchase requisition to Purchasing for custom items.
On receiving purchase delivery information from Purchasing, Production Planning
would generate the planning guide—a step-by step guide for manufacturing the custom product. Next, Production Planning would issue a schedule for allocating
machines and labor, and for providing deadlines regarding the completion of diffe-
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rent subassemblies.19 The planning guide, schedule, shipper, and purchase delivery information would then be forwarded to Manufacturing. In case of incomplete
product specifications, Production Planning would send memos to Sales, and sales
personnel would, jointly with the customer, provide necessary information, based
on which the planning guide or schedule could be finalized. If Manufacturing required any clarifications regarding the releases, it would notify the Production
Planning function, which would then send official memos to Engineering. Clarifications would also be communicated back, through official memos and documents,
from Engineering to Production Planning. Production Planning staff would then
forward the necessary documents to Manufacturing.
The dysfunctional structure and culture of MANCO significantly contributed
to the ineffectiveness of the process. For example, the sales agents, both internal
and external, were paid commissions even before a Purchase Order was generated
by the customer or complete specifications of the order were obtained. Even the
Sales managers of MANCO were evaluated on bookings rather than on shippings.
As a result, Sales had absolutely no stake in timely shipping of the product and,
therefore, had little incentive to ensure that complete specifications were provided
to Manufacturing in the production copy or even to respond promptly to requests
from Production Planning to provide complete specifications. Other difficulties arose
because of the relationship between Production Planning and Engineering. Production Planning unilaterally decided on the date when Engineering was supposed
to provide the releases, which would often not be compatible with the existing schedules of the engineers. Engineers, who saw their role primarily as developers of new
products and considered these minor modifications in the form of releases as low
priority activities, would, in turn, provide incomplete releases with drawings not updated, and this would further delay the manufacturing process. When Production
Planning would send memos, there was again no real reason for Engineering to

19

Given the unavailability of sophisticated computer tools at MANCO, the planning and
scheduling was actually done manually by planners within the Production Planning function.
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respond quickly, given that each department wanted the other not to succeed in its
goals. Yet another interesting problem arose because of the lack of communication
among the different functions. A former foreman explained:
Sales would put...[a] certain requested date on an order...so they
would take an order today...and they would want to ship it in a
month....well, the first place it has to go is credit approval. If they have
trouble getting credit approval, you are already delayed....Sales thinks
we have a month to build it...but if they use up a week in credit
approval, use up a week or so in Engineering...and it takes two or
more weeks to order parts, one month is gone...and suddenly it is
down to rush-rush to production.
A major problem was that no department knew the status of an order until it was its
turn to process it. When Accounting was performing the credit check, Engineering
and Manufacturing had no way of knowing that such an order had actually been
placed. Even Production Planning, once it had received the production copy from
Sales, did not consider the order to be active until it received the shipper. Potentially, the approval could take up to 21 days, and then engineering and manufacturing would have to be done within seven days, greatly disturbing existing schedules and resulting in tremendous overtime expenses as well as opportunity costs.
Also, goods produced under such circumstances could hardly be expected to be of
top quality.
V. TESTING STATEMENTS FROM THE
PRACTITIONER THEORIES-IN-USE
In this section, we present our assessment of the redesign effectiveness and
test the statements from the theories-in-use identified and articulated earlier in the
second section.
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING REDESIGN EFFECTIVENESS
Evaluation of redesign effectiveness and BPR implementation success is a
complex activity much like the evaluation of IS implementation success, and no uni-
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versally accepted criteria exists for such evaluations (Boudreau and Robey 1996;
Jones 1994). While several criteria for evaluations have been proposed (Boudreau
and Robey 1996; Eccles 1998; Sethi and King 1998), we believe, drawing on Lyytinen and Hirschheim’s notion of “expectation failure” (1987, p. 264), that an assessment of redesign effectiveness requires the recognition of the existence of multiple
stakeholders of the redesign initiative, having different values, levels of power and
interests, and hence, different expectations. This suggests that a thorough examination of the evaluations of the various stakeholders of the initiative is necessary.
For the purpose of this study, we consider redesign to be effective if different
stakeholders state or indicate through observable behaviors that such was the case.
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF REDESIGN AND AN ASSESSMENT
OF REDESIGN EFFECTIVENESS
The first phase of the reengineering initiative at MANCO involved the recognition of territorial walls in the organization, and their dismantling through the implementation of envisioned changes in the organizational structure, the reward systems, and the organizational culture. The CEO realized through experience that the
primary cause for territorial walls and their dysfunctional impact on business processes was that the vice presidents (VPs) had been involved in turf battles with
each other. He decided not only to replace the three VPs responsible for institutionalizing the inter-functional feuds but also to institute changes in the organizational structure that would prevent the resurgence of territorial sentiments among
employees at any level. In addition, he promoted a senior Sales manager to the
position of senior VP of Operations and put him in charge of the core cross-functional business process of the company: order-processing. Soon after his appointment, the new senior VP initiated (1) the redesign of the factory which involved
(among other changes) “taking out” a layer of foremen; (2) a quality assurance program; and (3) profit-sharing and other incentives for encouraging honest com-
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munication, cooperation and trust across functions. This entire phase was conducted without the involvement of external management consultants.
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Figure 4. Simplified Organization Structure of MANCO
(Relevant to Order Processing) After Phase I of the
Engineering Initiative
Figure 4 depicts the organization structure while Figure 5 shows the process
diagram for order-processing after the first phase of reengineering. It may be noted
that the primary difference between Figures 3 and 5 is that Figure 5 shows a number of dotted lines among functional areas, indicating that informal cross-functional
communications had opened up after the first phase. Stakeholders at different
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levels in the organization attested to the success of this phase of redesign and
implementation.20 For example, the Plant manager explained:
Even though the process is the same…the culture and value systems
changed remarkably. We started focusing on global goals, that being
serving the customer.
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Note: The dotted lines represent informal communication among the functional units.

Figure 5. Custom Order Processing at MANCO After Changes
in the Organizational Structure But Before IT-Enabled Changes
As another example, the Production facilitator felt that the reorganization provided
a strong foundation for the IT-enabled change phase of the initiative:
It is very important that before you undertake a project on the information systems side that you have good working relationships between
heads of all the departments…which we now have…and have not
had in the past.

20

In this phase, redesign and implementation occurred simultaneously, and thus, the redesign
could not be separately evaluated.
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Supplying additional testimony was the Production Planning manager, who pointed
out the benefit of having the senior vice president as the process owner for order
processing:
Planning does not have any direct authority, but we have to be the
link and satisfy both people [in] Sales and also Manufacturing. But
with all under one person here [the Senior VP], that made it a little bit
easier.
Also attesting to the success of the business process redesign and implementation
was the senior vice president, who was visibly pleased with the results of the structural and cultural changes, and said:
In the fiscal year that just ended…we said, let us ship the sales
forecast and let us try to under-spend the operating budget, which we
did, and we were able to have a record year.
The sense of teamwork and cooperation across functions was evident to all organization members. Informal communication channels across functional areas had
opened up, and it was not uncommon to see the Engineering manager walking
down to the Production Planning area for a “chat” with the planners, or the Production Planning manager visiting the Purchasing agent to informally negotiate the purchase delivery date.21 Territorialism had disappeared among the shop-floor workers
as well, and the HR manager estimated that over 50% of the shop floor workers
were positively affected by the recent changes.22
The second phase of reengineering involved the redesign of internal business processes and the selection of the appropriate software (BASYS23), followed
by the actual implementation of the IT-enabled business processes. As mentioned
earlier, we focus primarily on the redesign aspect of this phase in this paper.
21

Interviewees described these actions as unimaginable prior to the reorganization.

22

The HR manager enjoyed close working relationships with many factory workers and was
thus, in our view, in a position to evaluate the impact of the changes on the workers.
23

BASYS is the pseudonym of the software finally selected by MANCO. BASYS was
described by its vendors as “a fully integrated business management system designed for hybrid
manufacturers of discrete products.”
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Figure 5 is our rendering of the redesigners’ vision regarding “paperless” orderprocessing at MANCO. As in the previous diagrams, the dotted lines signify informal
communication that is necessary for coordination. The solid lines represent information that a functional area enters into the system, or information that any area obtains from the shared database of the system. The diagram shows that if a customer were to make an inquiry regarding any product, MANCO’s sales agents could,
with the aid of the BASYS product configurator,24 iteratively provide a customer with
a number of configuration options of a basic product. Once the configuration was
finalized, the order would be entered, and an expected shipping date would be provided by the system. In addition to providing a quick estimate of the shipping date,
the configurator would ensure that the order entered through this process would
necessarily (unlike the situation in the pre-BASYS process) be valid from a technical
standpoint and would also include complete specifications.
Periodically, the planners in Production Planning would review the new
orders and, if their own estimates were significantly different from the shipping dates
proposed by the system, the planners would notify Sales and informally negotiate
a new shipping date. Parallel to the activities of Sales and Production Planning
described above, Accounting would update credit limits of existing customers, and
determine the credit worthiness of new customers who placed orders. Since
Accounting would update the BASYS database regarding the credit status of customers as soon as the information became available, all other departments would
constantly be aware of the latest shipper status for different orders.
Once triggered by Production Planning, the configurator would take the order
and then, using the existing bill-of-materials, generate the purchase orders (which
Purchasing would periodically print out) and contact relevant vendors. Purchasing
would be responsible for the input of any information it had regarding a purchase

24

The configurator is offered as an add-on module to the basic BASYS system. According to
BASYS documents, the configurator “lets non-technical personnel select features and options to
configure a product on-line…[and] automatically generates the BOM and routings from the configurated order and supplies them to manufacturing.”
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order, such as delivery date or status. Other departments would thus have immediate access to this information. Also, based on the input from Production Planning
regarding plans and schedules, the system would generate plans, schedules and
relevant drawings for manufacturing the required product. We note that, in case of
any revision, only the latest version of these documents would be available electronically in the computer, thus avoiding confusion arising (earlier) from the existence of multiple versions.
As can be clearly seen, with the configurator taking over most of the functions that Engineering performed with respect to custom orders, Engineering would
be virtually freed from order processing responsibilities.25 If and when a new order
that could not be created as a combination of pre-existing parts and sub-assemblies
came in, Engineering would have to become involved, and would update the configurator database as required.
Most stakeholders appeared to be excited about the process as well as the
product of the redesign. For example, the Exports coordinator appeared very enthusiastic about the envisioned IT-enabled changes:
I can’t express how excited I am about it because it will free me up to
do more proactive things....I will have [information] at my fingertips....
it is going to allow me to focus in on really new exciting and challenging things that we have been planning for a while...and it is going
to change my entire position for the positive.
The Engineering manager was of the opinion that:
The redesign was hugely successful in that it will greatly impact the
way the Engineering and the Manufacturing side will work together....
however, one problem is that the Sales side is not willing to change
their commission structure...which will result in some implementation
difficulties.

25

Note the absence of the loop between Production Planning and Engineering in Figure 6 that
is present in Figure 3 as well as in Figure 5.
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Figure 6. Expected Information Flows Connected with Custom Order
Processing at MANCO at the End of Phases I and II of the
Reengineering Initiative
The Production Planning manager also attested to the effectiveness of the redesign:
I believe that the redesign was effective because we got a detailed
understanding of the organization...and determined what to do...in
order to make it more efficient...and to have the different departments
to work together without conflict.
By triangulating the views as well as actions of these and other stakeholders, we
conclude that the redesign of business processes was effective. This conclusion
is further strengthened based on the facts that: (1) various stakeholders predicted
success of the implementation even before the actual implementation started,
expressing confidence in the process of redesign and the project leadership; and
(2) various stakeholders described the implementation as successful after a large
proportion of the implementation had been completed. While we do not intend to
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imply that effective redesign is a necessary or sufficient condition for successful
implementation, we do believe that the effectiveness of the redesign enhanced the
confidence of the stakeholders and facilitated the implementation of the redesigned
process.
TESTING THE STATEMENTS IN THE PRACTITIONER
THEORIES-IN-USE ON REDESIGN
In this subsection, we discuss the deductive testing of the three theories-inuse, outlined earlier. For convenience, we have categorized the statements by two
key aspects of business process redesign,26 the first associated with the drivers/
enablers of the process of coming up with the redesign, and the second associated
with the technological enablers and social enablers of the envisioned processes.
We show the propositions along with the results of the deductive testing in Table 4.
TS1: Effective business process redesign can occur only if the
redesigning is IT-driven.
This statement posits IT-driven redesign as a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for effective redesign. The evidence at MANCO refutes this statement,
since effective redesign was accomplished even though the redesign effort was not
IT-driven.
In the first phase, the redesign was undertaken by the CEO and, later, by a
few handpicked members of MANCO’s management team. These individuals conceived of the changes in MANCO’s organizational structure and culture, not based
on capabilities of IT, but relying on common-sense application of organization theory
and quality management principles primarily to enable cross-functional collaboration
in the company.

26

It is worth mentioning here that not all aspects of redesign are relevant or viewed as equally
important in the literature. For example, it is clear that a technocentric theory would have little to say
about social enablers of envisioned business processes. Also, because we have focused on key
representative propositions of the three theories-in-use, we do not claim that the literature is
completely silent in areas where we indicate “No statement regarding redesign tested” in the table.
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In the second phase, the redesign process at MANCO started with different
departments proposing functional requirements and other changes that were necessary to make their business processes more effective. Most of the change requests
did not originate from MANCO employees’ awareness of capabilities of new information technologies but instead originated from their effort of addressing difficulties
that they were experiencing in their own work.
Table 4. Results of Deductive Testing
Aspect of
Business
Process
Redesign
Drivers/
Enablers of
the process
of redesign

Technocentric Theoryin-use
TS1: Effective business
process redesign can
occur only if the redesigning is IT-driven.
(FALSIFIED)
TS3: The use of
computerized BPR tools
will enhance redesign
effectiveness.
(FALSIFIED)

Drivers/
Enablers of
the
envisioned
processes

Overall
evaluation

Sociocentric Theoryin-Use
SS1: Effective redesign
of processes can be
accomplished only if the
redesign is driven by
leadership’s vision
regarding the reengineered processes.
(FALSIFIED)
SS2: Effective redesign
of processes can be
accomplished only if a
balanced team undertakes redesign.
(FALSIFIED)
No statement regarding
redesign tested.

TS2: Successful design
(and installation) of
enabling IT guarantees
the effectiveness of business process redesign
(and the effectiveness of
the implementation of
redesigned business
processes). (FALSIFIED)
Comprehensively falsified Falsified in the context
in the context of MANCO of MANCO, although
there appears to be
some supporting
evidence.
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Sociotechnical
Theory-in-Use
STS1: Effective
redesign of processes
can be accomplished
only if an understanding
of both the business
processes within the
social context and IT is
used during redesign.

STS2: Effective
redesign of a process
can occur only if the
redesigners seek to
enhance the functional
coupling in the business
process through the use
of technological as well
as social enablers.
Survived empirical
testing in the context of
MANCO; however, the
possibility of being
falsified in a different
context remains.
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Based on these change requests and outcomes of several meetings of the
business process redesign team, a requirements list for the process-enabling IT
was created, and 10 IT vendors were invited to present software products that could
satisfy MANCO’s requirements. One of the reengineering team members (the
Export Coordinator) described how the IT requirements and, consequently, the
vision of the new business processes evolved:
It was a series of meetings….We met…weekly and you just began to
interact…and Judith [the MIS Manager]…controlled how the meetings
were to go…and that helped you define everything…and when companies [the IT vendors] came in to give their presentation, that is
when you started getting into the nuts and bolts of it….So it is a process…it is something that you just don’t go in and [say]…OK, I am
going to want this, this, this…you had to think about what was needed
[regarding the business processes], and you brainstormed, then.. you
talked about what is definitely needed. You went back to your
bosses…[and asked] them what they were looking for…you would
brainstorm with that and then go back to the meetings.
As the team learned about different features available in different technologies, the
redesign team members modified their views of how any particular business process should function. With this modified vision, the team members then sought
other features in the systems that they had not thought of previously. MANCO’s
redesigners utilized their evolving understanding of the capabilities and limitations
of different IT’s along with, not prior to, their understanding of their business process
(re)designs. Iterative thinking informed by technological and functional/social issues
was also evident, although initially the redesigners appeared to have a tendency to
make IT fit their current business processes.
We presented evidence in the previous subsection that MANCO’s redesign
was effective. Based on the evidence in this subsection, it is also clear that the
redesign process did not involve what Hammer and Champy refer to as “inductive
thinking”—that is, the business processes were not redesigned using an IT-driven
methodology. Instead, the redesign originated from the recognition of a dysfunctional social organization, and thereafter, from functional requirements, and only
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subsequently involved IT during the recursive interaction of technological and
organizational requirements and capabilities in the redesigners’ minds consistent
with the competing sociotechnical theory-in-use of redesign (Davenport and Short
1990; Grover et al. 1995b; Markus and Robey 1995; Mumford 1995). Hence we
reject statement TS1.
TS2: Successful design and installation of enabling IT guarantees
the effectiveness of business process redesign (and the effectiveness of the implementation of redesigned business processes).
This statement posits successful design and installation of enabling IT as a
sufficient condition for effective redesign and implementation. The falsification of
this statement would involve identifying an empirical pattern of successful design
and implementation of enabling IT that did not lead to effective redesign and/or
effective implementation of the redesign.
The evidence at MANCO refutes TS2. The redesign started with the CEO
and a few other members of the management envisioning and making radical
changes to the social organization, not to the technological component of the
organization. Next, the MANCO employees from different departments brought their
requirements to the redesigners’ attention. The redesign team then attempted, in
an iterative fashion, to identify the IT that would fit the evolving redesign. At no point
did the redesign team members focus on designing the enabling IT itself. This evidence by itself, however, is insufficient to falsify the statement (since the successful
design and implementation of the enabling IT is proposed as a sufficient, but not
necessary condition, in S2). On the other hand, we also had access to historical
evidence pertaining to MANCO’s order-processing, and we observed that MANCO
had, a few years prior to its BPR effort, attempted unsuccessfully to streamline/
reengineer order processing using software that had already been successfully
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customized in-house at MANCO.27 Evidently, inaction by and conflict among the
VPs had prevented the seven member OPI (Order Processing Improvement) team
from redesigning organizational aspects and implementing recommendations. The
MIS manager, who had been a member of the OPI team, wrote in a memo:
Although every area agreed to abide by [the proposed] solutions, we
were concerned about obtaining results because we could only rely
on the goodwill of the different areas and we knew that was transient….We would like to believe there were compelling reasons why...
recommendations and agreements were not followed, but we cannot
comprehend what could have taken precedence over processing customer orders efficiently.
Reflecting on the “failed project,” the Production Planning manager stated:
It all goes back to trust and honesty and truthful communications….if
you don’t have this foundation, whatever system you have will not
work.
To summarize, historical evidence at MANCO indicates that effective design and
implementation of IT alone did not automatically result in effectiveness of redesign
and implementation of a business process. Hence we reject statement TS2.28
TS3: The use of computerized BPR tools29 will enhance redesign
effectiveness.
Essentially, this statement posits that the use of a computerized BPR tool
(e.g., for process mapping) will have a positive moderating effect on the redesign
effectiveness. This statement can be falsified by showing that the use of compu27

Multiple stakeholders of the “failed project” indicated that there was nothing wrong with the
software implemented in the project.
28

This finding is likely to ring true especially to ISD researchers who have, for many years,
emphasized the need for taking a sociotechnical approach that would balance the social and the
technical in software design and implementation (e.g., Bostrom and Heinen 1977; Davis et al. 1992;
Markus 1983; Robey 1987) rather than one that would adopt the traditional technology-imperative
approach. The falsification of TS2 brings to our attention the fact that the lessons that were learned
so painstakingly in the context of ISD have not been effectively transferred to the world of practice
and need to be relearned in the context of BPR.
29

Computerized tools, here, include flowcharting/process-mapping tools and simulation tools.
For this statement, we also assume that computerized tools must be easy to learn and use.
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terized tools had a negative or no effect on redesign effectiveness. Indeed, the
evidence at MANCO refutes statement TS3.
In the first phase, no BPR tool was used by the CEO or others involved. For
the redesign effort in the second phase, the MIS manager at MANCO had acquired
an easy-to-use computer-aided flowcharting tool, and this tool was used in the early
stages of process redesign. However, those who used the tool came to see it as not
having a positive impact on either the redesign process or the outcome.
The business process redesign at MANCO was accomplished through an
iterative process lasting several months in which the redesign team brainstormed,
discussed, and agreed upon different aspects of the future processes and the
organizational environment for the processes. Despite the flowcharting tool being
used at the beginning of the redesign effort, the evolving redesign came to exist
primarily in the minds of the redesigners in the form of a shared body of unwritten
knowledge. In other words, they all knew the redesigns “in their heads,” without
using the computerized flowcharting tool. This rendered the tool useless from the
perspective of the redesigners. On some occasions, especially for clarification
purposes, flowcharts were spontaneously hand drawn in redesign sessions, but at
no point was there any conscious attempt to create computer-drawn process diagrams representing the team’s then current view of any business process, even
though MANCO had flowcharting software readily available. Toward the end of the
redesign effort, the first author asked the MIS manager why the process redesigns
were not being represented/ documented using the flowcharting package. She
replied:
I had tried to do that…it just worked out to be an exercise for me…
basically. If you look in my book that I put together before the project
started, I had...two chapters…“business as it is” and “business as it
will be,” and the “will be” is still blank. The vision that we have right
now is kind of a high level and it hasn’t really come to fruition yet…we
will write [draw] it after we do it.
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Overall, she was convinced that the use of computerized flowcharting tools would
not contribute to a more effective redesign, especially in light of the iterative
approach to process redesign that the reengineering team had adopted. According
to the MIS manager, one advantage of this approach was that the design remained
very flexible, and could be continuously challenged and modified by the team members, who thought of different concerns as they learned more about the envisioned
process and process-enabling software options. When asked if she would use the
computerized tools in a larger company, the MIS manager indicated that she
probably would, although not because such tools would inherently enhance the
effectiveness of the process redesigns, but because they could help generate the
“professional documents” and contribute to the legitimacy of the redesigners in
larger organizations:
In a larger company you have to justify things a lot more….And you
have to get sign-offs and go through the levels of approval and all this
stuff…but here, it’s not like that.
Our observations during the redesign sessions also supported the team members’
shared view that the absence of computerized graphical tools helped the team
operate flexibly without getting bogged down on details and diagramming conventions. In fact, absence of computerized tools appeared to help the team concentrate
on developing a shared understanding of the redesign rather than on merely
creating a uniform representation of the vision.
Based on this evidence, we conclude that computerized tools did not
enhance the redesign effectiveness of order processing process flow at MANCO.
Hence, we reject statement TS3.30

30

We would like to point out that, through the falsification of TS3, we do not wish to imply that
computerized BPR tools should not be used. What we hope to have proven to the readers is that BPR
tools do not necessarily enhance redesign effectiveness (for all organizational contexts) as portrayed
unequivocally in the practitioner-oriented literature.
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The Sociocentric Theory-in-Use
SS1: Effective redesign of processes can be accomplished only if
the redesign is driven by leadership’s “vision” regarding the
reengineered processes.
As in testing the technocentric statements, we consider the two phases of the
initiative: first, the redesign of the organizational structure and culture, which was
conducted by the CEO with some assistance from members of the management,
and second, the redesign of the business processes (e.g., order processing) that
was accomplished by the redesign team without the intervention or active participation of the BPR initiative’s leaders (the CEO and the senior VP). In this (second)
phase, top management provided two broad guidelines to the redesign team: (1) the
reengineered MANCO needed to be an agile enterprise and (2) processes should
be redesigned keeping in mind that significant customization would not be authorized for the process-enabling software that was finally selected by the team.
Staying within these two guidelines, the process vision was developed bottom-up
by the redesign team through an iterative process, as described by the MIS
manager:
There is nothing as of yet cast in stone about how we want to be
when we come out of this…it’s like prototyping really.
Also, in an interview, the CEO clearly indicated his lack of involvement in the
formulation of the process visions:
To be candid with you...I am not personally following the process
closely at all. I’m taking it on faith that our management information
systems people and our operating people and our outside consultants
are approaching things carefully and consistently. But I won’t be able
to judge that until we’ve either won or lost on it. Partly, because I don’t
choose to get into details...and secondly, because they know about
what they’re doing.
Even the senior VP, who was seen as the champion of the entire initiative by the
redesign team members, was not a major source of ideas regarding the process
vision, which (in the second phase) evolved through the interaction of the redesign
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team members with the vendors as well as the software package (BASYS) that was
finally selected. Thus, while the leader(s) of the initiative did articulate the goal of
“enterprise agility,” and did recognize the need for (and made) changes to the structure and culture of MANCO, certainly the redesigned process configurations or their
effectiveness cannot be attributed to their vision. In other words, the evidence in the
case is not consistent with SS1, given that effective redesign occurred even though
the redesign was not based on the leadership’s vision of the process flows. We,
therefore, reject SS1.
SS2: Effective redesign of processes can be accomplished only if a
balanced team undertakes redesign.
In the first phase of the initiative, redesign was not undertaken by any team.
The CEO himself engineered the changes in the top management as well as part
of the organizational structure. Thereafter, he did involve some members of the
management such as the senior VP, the Quality manager, and the Production
Planning manager, although these individuals were not working collaboratively as
a team but rather under the direct supervision of the CEO, to rethink and implement
appropriate changes in the organization’s structure and culture. Also, this collection
of individuals could not be described as balanced since many functional areas and
hierarchical levels in the organization remained without representation.
In the second phase, the envisioning of the business processes in MANCO
was primarily done by the members of the redesign team. Careful attention was
given to the selection of the team, reflecting the fact that the leaders of the initiative
recognized the importance of creating a well-balanced team with competent members. The selection of team members was carried out in two phases: first, the MIS
manager obtained nominations for potential team members from each functional
area; and second, the nominees were evaluated, according to the MIS manager,
based on their understanding of their areas’ functions, the inter-relationships among
different functional areas, their ability to work constructively as a group, and their
ability to represent their areas’ special interests.
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As a participant observer in redesign sessions, the first author could see the
importance of bringing together a group of people from different functional areas
with an objective of improving the business processes of MANCO as a whole. It was
obvious, in many cases, that the absence of a team member of any functional area
from the redesign session would have resulted in the envisioning of a process that
was not acceptable to different stakeholder groups in MANCO. Such a business
process was likely to violate some fundamental assumptions of the functional area
that was not represented, that team members belonging to other functional areas
would not be aware of or sensitive to. It is also worth highlighting that the redesign
team was not just a symbolic entity acting as a façade, but actually, the team members’ recommendations regarding process, procedures, and technology were
respected and actually acted upon by the leadership of the initiative.
To summarize, in the second phase, MANCO’s business process redesign
was formulated by a “balanced” team consisting of representatives from different
functional units (e.g. MIS, Sales, Production Planning, Engineering, Manufacturing,
etc.), as well as an external consultant. The team also had representatives from
different levels in the organization (e.g., a foreman, who represented the interests
of the shopfloor workers, middle managers such as the Production Planning
manager, and the Plant manager who had overall responsibility of the operations),
again showing it was quite balanced. However, if we consider the fact that early
stages in the redesign were undertaken by the CEO and a few members of the
management up-front in order to set stage for the redesign team to work effectively,
we are not able to demonstrate that the entire redesign was undertaken by a
balanced team. Thus, we invalidate SS2, or at best, can claim partial support.
Sociotechnical Theory-in-Use
STS1:

Effective redesign of processes can be accomplished only
if an understanding of both the business processes within
the social context and IT is used during redesign.
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The evidence in MANCO is consistent with this statement. The entire
redesign effort involved a sequential-recursive design process, as described by
Markus and Robey (1995). First, the CEO and selected members of management,
recognizing that no system would work in the absence of an appropriate social
climate, engineered changes to the top management team as well as to the organizational structure, culture, and reward systems. Many remarks by the CEO during
an interview showed his understanding of the relationship between the social and
the technical. For example, he said that starting off the initiative with changes in the
technology “gives technology too high a rating,” and given that he had reached the
conclusion that the existing organization and management group could not achieve
high performance on a consistent basis, “that became the primary thing that needed
[to be] changed.” In his opinion, because “the social change was itself critical and
time consuming and not risk free...doing them [technical after social] consecutively
made sense….Because juggling two balls however good you are is tougher than
juggling one.”
Once the social dimension was fixed, the redesign team took over the
responsibility of developing the detailed process vision by iteratively revising the
design of the business process as the members came to be exposed to the different
technologies available for enabling the processes that they had in their minds. A
more detailed account of the recursive redesign process has been provided in the
context of testing TS1 earlier. Based on the above evidence gathered from MANCO,
we fail to falsify the statement STS1.
STS2:

Effective redesign of a process can occur only if the redesigners seek to enhance the functional coupling in the
business process through the use of technological as well
as social enablers.

The evidence in MANCO is consistent with this statement. As described
earlier, the redesign in MANCO consisted of two separate phases: in the first phase,
the CEO with the aid of a few managers envisioned how structural and cultural
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changes could dismantle the territorial walls between different functional areas; and
in the second phase, the reengineering team members envisioned improved business processes that were to be enabled through the use of an integrated database
system. Thus, it is clear that the MANCO reengineering team (and others spearheading the reengineering initiative) attempted to use social as well as technical
enablers to make business processes (especially order processing) in their organization more efficient and effective.
An examination of the diagram (Figure 3) showing information and paper
flows pertaining to order processing reveals that, prior to the reengineering initiative,
there was a very low level of functional coupling among functional units such as
Sales, Accounting, Engineering, and Production Planning. This low level of functional coupling resulted from the high level of physical coupling and the low level of
information coupling among departments.
As mentioned earlier in the case background, resolving any cross-functional
issue, such as committing to an agreeable delivery date, involved a lot of memo
exchanges (“memoing each other to death”), contributing to the high physical
coupling among the different functional units. Additionally, in almost all instances,
activities in departments were triggered by the arrival of a physical document from
another department, again indicating a high level of physical coupling that led to a
sequential (and often inefficient) flow of work. For example, the Production Planning
department would not start processing an order until it physically received a creditapproved shipper from Accounting.
The existence of territorial walls (prior to the first phase of the initiative)
among the different functional departments strongly suggests that there was a very
low degree of inter-functional collaboration through information sharing, which
further indicates that there was a low degree of information coupling among the
functional units.
The first phase of reengineering was targeted toward dismantling the interdepartmental territorial walls by using social enablers, thereby opening up infor-
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mation exchanges among the departments, and also eliminating the need for formal
memo exchanges in many cases, and consequently enhancing the level of information coupling and reducing the level of physical coupling among the functional units
involved (see Figure 5). For example, the decision to eliminate the practice of
relying on the receipt of the credit-approved shipper from Accounting as a trigger
to initiate order processing activities in Production Planning (which represented a
reduction in physical coupling), and the opening of informal communication channels between Production Planning and the Accounting department for discussing
the status of the shipper (which represented an increase in the level of information
coupling), was expected to (and actually did) create greater parallelism and collaboration in order processing, thereby contributing to a greater level of coupling
among functional areas in the company.
The second phase involved the use of primarily technological (but also
social) enablers to enhance functional coupling. The BASYS database was expected to be the medium for sharing data among functional units, consequently
eliminating paper handoffs among departments in many cases, thus increasing
parallelism in the business processes through a reduction in the level of physical
coupling among the concerned units (see Figure 5). The redesign team, for
example, had envisioned that, on receiving a sales order, the Sales department
would enter relevant order-related information into the system. Thus, without even
sending physical copies of the order, Production Planning would start examining the
feasibility of the proposed delivery dates, and indicate in the database itself if such
a date was feasible. If negotiations between Sales and Production Planning were
necessary regarding target dates, they would be conducted over the telephone in
a spirit reflecting trust and cooperation arising as a consequence of the social
enablers of cooperative organizational structure and culture in the first phase.
Working in parallel, Accounting would initiate the credit approval process and update the database when a decision was made. For large orders, and for cases
where the Accounting department had a reason to doubt the credit worthiness of the
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client, Accounting personnel would be in constant touch with the members of the
Production Planning department (as in a cross-functional team), thus enabling a
parallelism between credit-checking and manufacturing planning activities through
collaborative communication.
To summarize, the discussion shows that without the proposed use of both
the technical (e.g., BASYS and the add-on configurator) and the social enablers
(organizational culture and structure supportive of cross-functional cooperation, one
process owner for order processing, reward systems reinforcing cooperation, etc.),
albeit sequentially, those involved in creating the process vision at MANCO would
not have been able to formulate an effective redesign. Thus, we fail to reject the
statement STS2.
VI. CONCLUSION
The major ramification of our case study for IS researchers is that it successfully challenges the technocentric theory regarding business process redesign. By
subjecting practitioner beliefs “about how to act effectively…to the most rigorous
tests available” consistent with Argyris’s view of good science, we find that statements of the dominant practitioner theory-in-use are logical (i.e., consistent with one
another), but not empirical (i.e., they do not portray the “real world”).31 In the
process of challenging the technocentric view, our case study also invalidates the
sociocentric theory-in-use, another competing practitioner perspective evidenced
in the BPR literature, thereby demonstrating the lack of survivability of both the
perspectives.
For researchers and practitioners wary of the functionalist and instrumental
nature of some BPR philosophies, our case study serves the purpose of providing
31
While a majority of IS practitioners and IS researchers might be knowledgeable, at some
level, of the fact that the technocentric or the sociocentric approach does not work, it is remarkable
that, for many of them, their preference for a technology-driven theory of redesign in the context of
BPR, ERP implementation, e-business design is readily apparent (from the literature as well as from
first-hand observations/interactions). We hope that this case study demonstrates that such
approaches are fundamentally problematic.
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concrete evidence that confirms their suspicions and exposes the invalidity of a
technologically deterministic as well as socially deterministic orientation to business
process redesign. Indeed, our case study is useful for invoking the following parallel: just as IS researchers interested in information systems development (ISD)
have long been moving away from just a functionalist and instrumental view (c.f.
Hirschheim and Klein 1989), IS researchers interested in business process redesign
should consider doing the same. Specifically, future research on redesign might
look to the past and current research on ISD for suggesting analogies of how to
proceed.
Along the same lines, the major ramification for practitioners, including consultants and senior management, is that it could turn out that BPR, just as ISD, can
be more successful in the situation where interactions between the social and technological dimensions are anticipated and acted upon, than the situation where one
of the two dimensions (technological or social) is given all the attention.
Indeed, for critical researchers and skeptical practitioners, the overarching
lesson of our case study could be that BPR is but the latest arena in which
researchers and practitioners are relearning old lessons by repeating past mistakes.
For newly emerging arenas, such as design/implementation intranets, virtual organizations, and, especially enterprise resource planning systems, all of which draw on
the body of knowledge on business process redesign, this means that it would be
prudent for researchers and practitioners to adopt, from the beginning, an orientation that is neither technocentric nor sociocentric, but instead gives equal consideration to technical and social dimensions, and their interactions.
Our single case study is analogous to a single experiment. As for any scientific experiment, we believe that follow up studies (case studies, surveys, ethnographies, action research, additional experiments, and so forth) are in order,
whether to replicate, challenge, or otherwise build on our case study and its
findings. Positivist case studies, as our intensive examination of MANCO illustrates,
are a viable method for contributing to this research stream, and we believe that this
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paper can serve as a valuable guide for future researchers interested in deductively
testing scientific theories or practitioner theories using case research.
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